Date:
Holy Saturday, April 4, 2026, 4:00–6:00 p.m.

Topic:
Philosophical reflections on tyrannicide: Can the targeted killing of a person be justified?

Location:
Kunsthaus, Schulberg 10

Fee:
10.00 euros

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed during the very first wave of Israeli-U.S. airstrikes on Iran on February 28, 2026. Khamenei’s death was officially confirmed by Iranian state media on March 1, 2026. According to an investigation by The New York Times, Khamenei’s killing had been planned over a long period of time and was then carried out with great precision.

As the days and weeks following the initial attacks on February 28 have shown and continue to show, Khamenei’s killing did not lead to a swift end to the hostilities; at the time of writing this announcement on March 22, 2026, violence in the Gold Region has continued to escalate. Nor does the regime in Iran appear to have come under any significant internal pressure following the start of the Israeli-U.S. attacks. Thus, to the extent that the objective of Khamenei’s assassination was, on the one hand, to bring about a swift end to the violent conflict in the region and/or, on the other hand, to motivate Iranian actors to overthrow the regime, these objectives have evidently not been achieved.

But do the consequences of such an assassination even play a role in assessing the act itself? And what about the other people who died in the attack on Khamenei’s residence in Tehran on February 28—what role do their deaths play? As officially confirmed, a number of members of the Iranian regime’s leadership were killed in the attack on Khamenei’s residence. However, one must assume that, in addition, other individuals who were present at Khamenei’s residence at the time of the attack and who likely played no special role for the regime—such as domestic and administrative staff—were also killed. Is it justified to accept these deaths in order to eliminate a tyrant?